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Todd Howland is the Interim Director of the Environmental Justice Clinic and Visiting Professor of Law at Vermont Law and Graduate School, and a Senior Fellow at the Institute on Race, Power and Political Economy at the New School. As a former senior UN official, Howland served as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Representative in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola, among other posts. He authored about 30 scholarly articles on human rights, including those published in the Human Rights Quarterly, the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, and the Virginia Journal of International Law. He also published 80 commentaries on human rights in newspapers and magazines, including in the Washington Post, LA Times, the Toronto Globe and Mail, and Revista Semana. He was recently published in the Oxford Human Rights Hub and Open Global Rights. Human rights law empowers individuals to challenge powerful actors (state and non-state) when those actors exercise power without consideration of the impact on the rights of others. Globally, including in the U.S., individuals have the right to participate in decisions that affect their livelihoods, health, education, and other aspects of their lives. President Trump’s tariffs appear to be implemented without considering these rights . Consider a flower industry worker in Colombia. A sudden tariff of 10%, 25%, or 50% could devastate their business and the communities depending on it. Similar harms can occur across industries. Tariffs do not inherently violate human rights law, but governments must assess and mitigate their potential impacts. Trump’s tariffs—whether the original , paused , revised, or rejected by the courts—      exceeded his authority under both domestic and international law and harmed lives globally . Ironically, this overreach may catalyze a renewed embrace of international law , especially human rights law in economic governance. It could mark the end of the notion that trade and business operate independently of human rights protections. This article argues that human rights law already applies to tariffs and that the international community must use these laws to protect individuals everywhere—including within the U.S— from their harmful effects. Abuse of Authority Under U.S. Law Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, only Congress, not the President, has the authority to tax . Tariffs are a tax . While Congress authorized the president to adjust tariffs for specific economic policies , these powers come with numerous restrictions . President Trump argues he has emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( IEEPA ) to impose tariffs. This argument is pending at the U.S. Supreme Court. President Trump lost this argument in the U.S. Court of International Trade , in an alternative case at the U.S. District Court , and in a consolidated case at the U.S. Federal Appeals Court . The courts all found that President Trump’s use of the IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs exceeded his authority, as the statute does not grant the president broad taxation powers without congressional approval.      Some members of Congress attempted, albeit cautiously, to rein in this overreach through proposed legislation , and the Senate has twice voted to repeal Trump-imposed tariffs, once related to Canada and another time related to Brazil , but neither bill moved forward in the House of Representatives.      Violations of International Law Trump’s unilateral tariff actions also violate the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, which remains binding on the U.S. , despite his administration’s hostility toward international law. Article 1(3) of the UN Charter outlines the UN’s purpose: to foster international cooperation in solving economic, social, and humanitarian problems, and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although tariffs themselves may not inherently conflict with these goals, Trump’s arbitrary and unilateral approach—disregarding the rights of affected individuals—does. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force or coercion in international relations in ways inconsistent with the UN’s purposes. Although some Western states resisted defining economic coercion as force , few would deny that Trump’s tariffs contradict the Charter’s principles. This evolving argument—that economic actions must comply with human rights law —is gaining traction , particularly through human rights law’s treatment of sanctions and unilateral coercive measures . This same logic can be applied to unilateral and arbitrary use of tariffs. Sanctions and Unilateral Coercive Measures The UN Human Rights Council has long expressed concern over broad sanctions and coercive measures, citing their severe impact on rights such as health, education, food, and housing. In its latest resolution on the topic from April 2025, the Council reaffirmed the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and freedom of trade—core tenets of international law. In paragraph 6 of the recent resolution, the Human Rights Council condemned “the continued unilateral application and enforcement by certain powers of such measures as tools of pressure.” This resolution also condemned “political and economic pressure, against any country, particularly against least developed and developing countries, with a view to preventing these countries from exercising their right to decide, of their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems.”   General Comment 8 from the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights emphasized how sanctions undermine individuals’ ability to work and live. Experts have highlighted the suffering caused by sanctions—disrupting economies, suffocating trade, and destroying productive systems. In 2021 and again in 2023 , the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for critical re-evaluation, stressing that sanctions must comply with international law, include fair processes, and be subject to review and remedy. They must also be time-limited and monitored through independent human rights assessments. The Office of the High Commissioner is currently preparing a report detailing how economic sanctions and unilateral coercive measures can violate member states’ human rights obligations. Human Rights and the Need for Guardrails on Tariffs Human rights law is a distinct branch of international law that protects citizens and non-citizens from powerful entities , including states and businesses. For every right, human rights law provides a remedy . However, there are many challenges to obtaining a remedy for transboundary human rights violations. Whether through sanctions or tariffs, economic measures should be regularly reviewed for their human rights impacts. Tariffs can cause serious harm to human rights across multiple countries. The Colombian flower grower mentioned earlier may lack standing in U.S. courts to challenge the tariffs, but there is a violation of their right to livelihood and other associated rights . Because human rights law includes the right to remedy, such cases may eventually reach UN Special Rapporteurs, treaty bodies, regional commissions, and courts. Viewing President Trump’s tariffs through a human rights lens is novel, but necessary. For too long, the human rights movement justified the neoliberal practice of imposing costs on individuals not directly engaged in the economic transaction. This separation of human rights and economic policy allowed environmental degradation and other rights violations to persist in the name of profit and GDP growth. The selective application of human rights weakened their ability to protect core rights like health and life. While many critiques focus on how Trump’s tariffs violate World Trade Organization (WTO) norms, the WTO’s attempt to construct silos to keep human rights away from economic governance undermined both its legitimacy and the broader human rights framework. Over time, this disconnect will erode the WTO’s relevance. In response, social movements increasingly used economic rights to challenge market-driven violations and the concentration of political and economic power. The Human Rights Economy initiative seeks to correct this historic blind spot by applying human rights law to confront economic practices that harm individuals and communities.   Human Rights Economy can be expressed in ten pathways , including centring human rights in economic policies, regulations, and business operations. A practical example of this is human rights budgeting in various countries, including in Kenya .   If the U.S. government respected human rights in its trade policy, it would establish guardrails to prevent collateral damage. Consider Costa Rica, which spends 12.5% of public expenditures on education and relies on the U.S. for nearly half its exports. A 10% tariff could significantly reduce revenue, threatening education and other essential services. Some scholars argue that human rights law does not apply extraterritorially, but other scholars increasingly see this view as outdated. Developments in environmental and climate litigation show how human rights law can—and must—constrain harmful actions by governments and corporations in a globalized world. Conclusion International law, and human rights law in particular, remains a vital tool to check abuses of power. President Trump’s use of tariffs without regard for their human impact violates these principles. Even without legal standing in U.S. courts, global consumers can use their purchasing power to send a message. President Trump seems to forget that the U.S. represents just 4.23% of the global population . While it has the largest economy, the combined economies of the rest of the world far surpass it. By acting unilaterally, the U.S. risks backlash—legal, economic, and moral—that could ultimately strengthen human rights protections and accelerate the rise of a Human Rights Economy.

Image Available Here Arnav Laroia is a fourth-year law student at The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (WBNUJS) in Kolkata, India. He has strong academic interests in public international law, international humanitarian law, criminal law, and constitutional law. He also serves as the Chief of Staff—South Asia at JURIST, the world’s only law school-based comprehensive legal news service reporting on the rule of law in crisis. Introduction On August 21, 2025, Saudi authorities executed Jalal al-Labbad , a young Shi’a man sentenced to death for offenses allegedly committed during protests in 2011 and 2012, when he was still a minor. Al-Labbad was arrested without a warrant in 2017. In the period leading up to his criminal trial, the authorities refused him access to legal counsel and subjected him to months of solitary confinement and physical abuse. His family was not informed of his date of execution, and upon learning about his death on social media, was not permitted access to his body. The case instantly attracted international condemnation. UN human rights officials   denounced the execution as a blatant breach of Saudi Arabia's treaty commitments and called for the government to suspend all death penalties ordered for crimes committed before the age of 18. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International also criticized  the act, highlighting the increasing trend   of capital punishment used against political opposition and minorities. The case reflects the persistent conflict between domestic Saudi practices and international human rights obligations, posing pressing questions about the enforcement, the responsibility, and the universality of the prohibition on juvenile executions. Legal Framework Under International Law Executing individuals for crimes they committed as minors violates one of the strictest prohibitions of international human rights law. Article 37(a)  of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)   states that "neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons under 18 years of age." The CRC has attained near-universal ratification with 196 States parties, inscribing this prohibition as a binding norm of international consensus. Saudi Arabia ratified  the CRC in 1996 and therefore is legally bound under Article 37(a). Moreover, Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)  recognizes the right to life, and is reinforced  by Article 6(5), which forbids the death sentence for crimes committed by those under the age of 18. Although the UN considers the ban to be customary international law, Saudi Arabia is not a signatory  to the ICCPR, hence this provision does not immediately bind it. Still, it is important to note that The Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 36 highlights  that this ban is absolute and non-derogable, even in times of public emergencies. Article 6(1) is also closely connected to fair-trial assurances; wherein execution of juveniles is preceded by unfair proceedings, the violation is exacerbated. The Convention against Torture (CAT) , ratified by Saudi Arabia in 1997, entails further legal obligations regarding the death penalty.  CAT forbids  the use of evidence derived by torture, and interprets the application of the death penalty following ill-treatment or coercion as a violation of Articles 2 and 15. Al-Labbad's solitary confinement for extended periods of time, physical abuse allegations, and forced confessions trigger these protections directly. Saudi Arabia sought to circumscribe these commitments with sweeping interpretive reservations  upon ratification of the CRC to ensure consistency  with Islamic law. However, UN treaty bodies have emphasized  that such reservations cannot be invoked to justify juvenile executions, because they remain incompatible with Article 37(a) of the CRC and are increasingly recognized as prohibited under customary international law. The legal framework thus leaves little ambiguity: juvenile executions, especially when coupled with torture and biased trials, are incompatible with Saudi Arabia's international commitments. Domestic Law v. Practical Reality in Saudi Arabia’s Context   On paper, Saudi Arabia introduced reforms  that seemed to curb the scope of juvenile executions. In 2018, Saudi Arabia passed the Juveniles Law, which introduced procedural protections for children. Later, in 2020, a royal decree declared that the death penalty would no longer be imposed on people convicted of crimes committed before the age of 18, setting a maximum ten-year term in juvenile detention. Internationally, these steps were received as indications  of positive development. However, a closer reading shows significant loopholes and gaps  in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to limit juvenile executions. The 2020 royal decree specifically left out  offences tried under the kingdom's counterterror legislation as well as certain types of crime under Islamic law (hudud and qisas). Consequently, numerous children suspected of taking part in political demonstrations or security offenses continue to face exposure to the death penalty. Accounts by the European Saudi Organization for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch have shown at least a dozen youth defendants remaining on death row  in spite of the purported reforms . The case of Jalal al-Labbad shows how juvenile executions operate in reality, despite purported progress. While his supposed involvement in demonstrations took place when he was a juvenile, he was tried under terrorism charges in front of the Specialized Criminal Court. His detention involved extended periods of solitary confinement and physical torture, in flagrant disregard  for domestic legal protections and international commitments. Depriving him of legal counsel and failing to notify his family before his execution constituted additional violations, indicating systemic indifference towards guarantees of fair trial. The ongoing practice of juvenile executions in Saudi Arabia follows not only from legislative loopholes, but from their intersection with politically motivated security prosecutions. By defining dissent as terrorism and relying on religion-based exceptions, the authorities preserve wide latitude to sentence minors to death. The fact that Jalal al-Labbad was charged with terrorism offenses for his participation in demonstrations serves as a critical illustration of a problematic disjuncture between Saudi Arabia's reformist discourse and its deep-rooted punitive culture. Comparative Perspectives on Juvenile Executions To get a better understanding of Saudi Arabia’s stance on the death penalty but also prospects for reform, it is essential to examine and compare both countries that have moved toward abolition but also those who maintain such practices. Iran remains one of the world’s most persistent violators of the prohibition against juvenile executions. Despite being a party to the CRC and the ICCPR, Iran continues to impose  the death penalty on juvenile offenders under its Islamic Penal Code. The law distinguishes  between hudud (fixed punishments under Shari’a) and qisas (retributive punishments), both of which may still be applied to individuals convicted of capital crimes committed as minors. Though the law provides for judicial discretion to take into account the mental maturity of the offender, in reality, courts often affirm death sentences  following routine examinations. Human rights groups have reported dozens of juvenile executions over the last ten years, including some as recently as 2023. These structural issues are replicated in Saudi Arabia: age assessment is usually unreliable, torture-derived confessions are still admissible, and political dissent is often recharacterized as criminal under religious or security legislation. Iran, like Saudi Arabia, uses its religious legal system to deflect complete adherence to treaty commitments. This comparative illustration shows that as long as governments maintain religious­, or security-based exceptions­, child executions will persist despite unequivocal international bans. It further emphasizes the importance of bolstering technical protections—such as independent age determination and exclusionary provisions for coerced confessions—accompanied by diplomatic pressure. By contrast, some states have moved towards total abolition of juvenile executions. The United States, for instance, ended juvenile executions twenty years ago by way of constitutional adjudication. In Roper v. Simmons (2005) , the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment's  ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" forbade capital punishment for offenses committed by those under the age of 18. The Court had relied on evolving standards of decency, neuropsychological evidence of adolescent development, and comparative international practice. Significantly, the judgment insisted on reduced culpability and increased potential for rehabilitation in children, rendering categorical abolition  imperative. While U.S. constitutional law has no binding effect in foreign jurisdictions, Roper  has been cited as an influential authority  in many contexts, including human rights institutions. The abolition of juvenile executions in the United States demonstrates a case where scientific argument and comparative analogy were used to align domestic law with international standards. For Saudi Arabia, implementing a similar strategy using teenage brain science and the potential of rehabilitation may provide a less politically antagonistic route to compliance. Europe offers an alternative abolitionist approach. The United Kingdom completely abolished the death penalty  in 1998. In line with this, the European Union requires  the abolition of capital punishment as a condition of membership. In addition, the EU employs diplomatic means , including démarches and conditional co-operation agreements, to put retentionist states under pressure to conform. This illustrates how regional systems can build normative pressure and provide incentives for compliance in excess of treaty obligation. The Way Forward In the short term, Saudi Arabia should immediately halt all executions for offenses committed by individuals under the age of eighteen. The case of Jalal al-Labbad underscores the need for basic procedural safeguards, including timely notification to families and access to independent autopsies consistent with international best practices. These measures are not only humanitarian imperatives but also absolute obligations under the CRC and CAT. Medium-term reform necessitates reconciling Saudi law with the Kingdom's treaty obligations. This involves withdrawing or clarifying reservations to the CRC that undermine the ban on juvenile executions, so that counterterrorism and religious-law exceptions cannot trump Article 37(a). Domestic legislation must unequivocally prohibit the imposition of death sentences on children, regardless of the category of crime. In addition, procedural protections should be enhanced, including access to qualified legal counsel, mandatory age assessments conducted by independent experts, and strict exclusion of involuntary confessions. The international community must apply concerted pressure. UN special procedures and treaty bodies need to continue highlighting cases  where juvenile executions occur . States with diplomatic or economic engagement with Saudi Arabia need to incorporate human rights conditions into bilateral relations. In addition, comparative jurisprudence from cases like Roper v. Simmons  and European abolitionist practice can provide persuasive models grounded in science, adolescent development, and rehabilitation. Framing reform through these evidence-based approaches, rather than politicized critique, may make such narratives more acceptable to domestic stakeholders. Jalal al-Labbad's death sentence and execution are testament to the ongoing gulf  between Saudi Arabia's international human rights obligations and its practice within the penal system. To execute an individual who was a minor at the time of the crime disregards not only the  CRC and CAT provisions but also the very foundations of justice and child protection. Cures lie in categorical elimination of juvenile executions, procedural protection, and continued international activism. Only by enacting such reforms can Saudi Arabia bring its criminal justice system into conformity with accepted international human rights standards.

Suhana is a third-year undergraduate student at Hidayatullah National Law University, India. Image available here . Introduction South Korea is home to some of the world’s most influential tech giants, such as Samsung, that have secured their positions as industrial powerhouses. However, this part of the market is largely dominated by Korea’s wealthy elite , commonly referred to as large family-owned business conglomerate s,  or “chaebols”. Each chaebol consists of a network of affiliated companies operating across diverse sectors, such as electronics, automobiles, construction, and finance. Even if a chaebol does not own a majority stake in each of its affiliated companies, its strong relationship with each relevant sector is marked by decades-long partnerships between big businesses. Recently, the South Korean National Assembly passed an “amended bill” on August 25, 2025, aimed at curbing chaebols’ dominance. This blog post explores whether such a reform was necessary, if it will prove sufficient in the long run, and provides further recommendations based on similar reforms in other legal systems. Identifying the Problem At the heart of South Korea’s corporate governance challenge is the chaebol ownership structure wherein they engage in an intricate system of  cross-shareholding . This means that within the conglomerates, companies own shares in one another, forming a closed network of internal ownership. This allows founding families to retain control over vast corporate groups despite holding relatively small direct stakes. As a result, these conglomerates effectively function as self-contained corporate empires, shielded from external oversight and minority stakeholder scrutiny. Such structure enhances their concentrated power and weakens corporate accountability, as management decisions often prioritize the controlling family’s interests over those of minority shareholders or the market at large. This internal favouritism can also be manifested in the form of preferential contracts, unfair resource allocation, or governance appointments that serve family control rather than corporate efficiency. It also leads to multiple consequences on the financial side, for instance, opaque transactions and circular financing where funds flow only in a network of affiliated companies through loans or investments without any effort to generate real economic value. Another issue which rises from the chaebol ownership structure is that of double-accounting, where, for example, Company A owns forty  percent of Company B’s shares, and Company B also owns forty percent of Company A’s shares. When Company A prepares its financial statements, it includes the value of its shares in Company B as an asset. However, since Company B owns shares in Company A, the value of Company A’s shares is indirectly inflated by Company B’s value, which already includes Company A’s shares in it. Thus, the value of cross-held equity shares is first counted during the valuation of the company that issued the shares, and is counted again when valuing the assets of the other company, which cross-holds those equity shares. This ultimately leads to a volatile market that discourages foreign investors from entering it. The collective dominance of chaebols in South Korea creates a web of mutual ownership that undermines the rights of minority shareholders by giving families disproportionate influence over the nation’s economy. Such practices produce serious economic distortions by obscuring firms’ true financial conditions and interlinking their fortunes, ultimately increasing systemic risk and discouraging foreign investment. It is pertinent to consider these consequences more broadly: South Korean companies’ stocks trade at lower valuations as compared to their global competitors and are undervalued relative to their earnings and assets. These dynamics which collectively contribute to the low valuation of Korean companies, are commonly referred to as the “Korea Discount”. The Amendment In response to the persistent Korea Discount and long-standing concerns about chaebol-dominated governance, the National Assembly passed major reforms  to the Korean Commercial Code (KCC) on July 3, 2025, followed by a presidential proclamation on July 22, 2025. These amendments, namely provisions related to the voting system and outside auditing, mark significant corporate governance updates, aiming to strengthen transparency, enhance shareholder protections, and rebuild investor confidence. But the amendments didn’t stop here, as the National Assembly also passed a bill in August 2025 to amend the KCC to further protect the interests of minority shareholders. The amendment seeks to strengthen corporate governance and enhance investor confidence by expanding directors’ fiduciary duties to improve corporate valuations of companies under Article 382-3 . Now, along with the previous provision of “performance of duties in good faith in the interest of the company,” directors also need to protect the interests of the shareholders as a whole and treat the same equitably. Specifically, the bill introduces two major changes . First, under Article 542-7 , “listed companies with assets greater than 2 trillion won will be required to introduce a cumulative voting system under enabling minority shareholders to concentrate their votes on specific board candidates during proxy fights.” In chaebols, the founding families hold enough shares to dominate board appointments and other related decisions, meaning that minority shareholders often lack the voting power to elect directors despite collectively owning many shares. With the cumulative voting system, minority shareholders can pool their votes for one or a few candidates during proxy fights where different shareholder groups campaign for their own nominees to the board. Second, under Article 542-12 , “listed companies will also be required to increase the number of audit members to at least two, who are to be elected separately from the board of directors.” Possible Implications The most immediate impact of the recent amendments is that minority shareholders will hold meaningful influence over corporate governance. The introduction of mandatory cumulative voting and independent audit committee members lessens chaebol dominance and provides more balanced representation. These changes have the potential to bring in more domestic and foreign activist investors while holding firms that were previously shielded from external scrutiny more accountable. Further, South Korea’s opaque governance has long been criticized by global investors for limiting the fair valuation of companies. The amendments signal a more transparent and equitable environment, which can foster market and investor confidence. Additionally, there may be a shift in corporate behaviour wherein boards become more cautious while balancing company-related decisions against the risk of minority opposition. However, shareholders who were previously excluded from influence may attempt to push the limits of these amendments through litigation. With new rights comes the likelihood of greater disputes. Hence, companies could face increased compliance costs and uncertainty as to how courts interpret the new amendments. Will the amendments suffice in the long run? One limitation of the amendments is their narrow focus, as the provisions will do little to dismantle the deeply embedded dominance of chaebol families in almost all spheres of life. The driving force behind these amendments was the Korea Discount, rooted in the cross-shareholding practices of chaebol families. Yet, this issue is left largely unaddressed. Further, the amendments provide no guidance for how directors should resolve the conflict between short-term shareholder demands and long-term corporate strategy. The amendments also ignore other affiliated issues surrounding minority protection, such as binding say-on-pay rights, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation and remuneration packages of top executives. Similarly, mandatory disclosure of related-party transactions under which companies must publicly reveal any financial dealings or contracts they have with “related” parties like directors and shareholders, remains outside the scope of the reforms. This is important to ensure that profits are not being diverted to family members or losses are not being inflated or hidden. While the amendments reflect a commitment to increase transparency and shareholder activism, they fail to address the core reasons for the Korea Discount's structural form. Korea's undervaluation primarily stems from its opaque ownership structures, cross-shareholdings, as well as concentrated control held by chaebol families as discussed above. The amendments, although progressive as they extend fiduciary duties and increase minority representation, fail to significantly erase such ingrained governance structures. Without restriction of intra-group shareholding, stronger enforcement of disclosure regulations, or family control reductions in boards, such reforms do little to bring real change in how chaebols are controlled or managed. Suggestions The current amendments are certainly a step in the right direction, but they should not be implemented in isolation. What is required instead is a comprehensive, multi-fold legal framework that addresses the issue in its entirety. For this, South Korea can take inspiration from the EU Directive 2017/828    and inculcate a three-prong disclosure system: (i)  shareholders should have a say-on-pay policy allowing them to know how much the directors are being paid and thus create a stronger link between the pay and performance expected; (ii) companies should reveal all material related-party transactions that have the potential of creating risks for minority shareholders by submitting them for approval by the board; and (iii) asset managers and institutional investors should disclose how are they investing and engaging with the company while encouraging long-term goals in investment strategies relating to environmental and social issues. These measures will give investors slight leverage over managerial incentives and reduce the risk of self-dealing, two of the most persistent problems in governance by chaebols. Similar recommendations can be taken from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Under Section 302 , senior executives are personally required to certify   the accuracy and completeness of financial statements, thereby ensuring disclosure integrity, along with penalties prescribed under Section 802  for the destruction or alteration of financial records. Section 404  mandates an Internal Control Report with external auditors independently attesting to their effectiveness. Finally, Section 806  deals with whistleblower protection and encourages “the disclosure of corporate fraud by protecting employees of publicly traded companies or their subsidiaries who report illegal activities.” Introducing such protections in South Korea would foster a culture of transparency and early detection of misconduct. Such amendments should thus be coupled with similar provisions in the realm of the broader ambit of corporate strategy. For smoother administration of these provisions, South Korea can also adopt other reforms like the “Comply or Explain” model, under which, if a company does not comply with regulations and instead aligns with other bespoke governance arrangements, they must explain how the latter is more suitable for better standards of efficiency. This model exists in multiple jurisdictions, such as the UK, as described in the Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance , and Singapore, as described in Singapore’s Code of Corporate Governance . South Korea’s current uniform approach does not suit all companies in the country due to multiple factors like ownership, geography, size, and complexity. This is because such a one-size-fits-all approach, which mandates similar compliance for all firms, ensures consistency but often ignores the operational realities of companies that differ in structure and capacity. A similar method can be establishing safe harbours in the form of legal provisions that protect directors from liability when decisions undertaken are based on some reasonable business judgement, even if they prove disadvantageous to shareholders in the short run. Additionally, requiring separate voting for audit committee members, which empowers minority shareholders to participate more actively in shaping corporate insights, should be made more autonomous, like in the United States. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates all audit committee members in listed companies to be fully independent of management under Section 301 . A more ambitious reform would be to permit complete independence of audit committees, ensuring that oversight of financial reporting and internal controls is beyond the reach of controlling shareholders. Further, to tackle the problem of excessive litigation as identified before, South Korea can adopt litigation filters or specialized commercial courts, which balance accountability with the protection of management from trivial lawsuits. Lastly, South Korea can attempt to disrupt the chaebol foundation using a two-pronged approach. First, regulatory authorities could mandate the slow unwinding of the already existing cross-shareholding arrangements by giving a timeline to prevent market shock, to make sure that ownership and control are actually separated. Second, it could impose stricter caps on voting rights derived from indirect holdings. This will ensure that the family ownership through circular chains does not give control beyond fair economic stakes. For instance, a one-share, one-vote principle can help align shareholding influence with financial risk. Circular ownership in this context refers to situations where companies within the same conglomerate hold shares in each other and thereby create a loop that leads to chaebol families controlling much more than they actually own, similar to cross-shareholding. Conclusion The August 2025 amendment to the KCC is a significant step toward redefining corporate governance by expanding shareholder rights and strengthening board accountability. It is an earnest effort to counter the Korea Discount and increase investor confidence. This analysis reveals that the reform is still in its infancy, addressing certain governance concerns but not entirely dismantling long-standing chaebol dominance based on opaque cross-shareholding and circular ownership arrangements. Without supplementary measures like stricter independence requirements for audit committees, litigation filters, stronger disclosure standards, and structural restraints on chaebol control, the amendment could end up being a cosmetic rather than a revolutionary reform.

Vaishali Patro is a third-year B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) student at the National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), Kolkata. A space satellite hovering above the coastline. Available here At   COP28 , nearly 200 countries recognized the need to transition away from fossil fuels to achieve net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. To achieve this, they agreed to have   sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 43% by 2030 and 60% by 2035. Some countries like   Germany  and   Finland  plan to achieve carbon neutrality before 2050. These ambitious targets, coupled with a   decrease in the cost of solar technology , continue to steer countries toward solar power. In recent years, there has been increased discourse on space-based solar power (‘SBSP’). This year, Japan  and   China  will attempt to transform SBSP from an idea to a reality. Doing so would allow them to harness solar energy from space and transmit it back to Earth. In this article, I will explore the current outer space liability regime is inadequate to apply to SBSP and leaves these projects vulnerable to negligent damage. Space-Based Solar Power – Old to Gold? Solar power is already a primary power source for space objects such as the   Hubble Telescope , Starlink , and the   International Space Station . These space objects use solar arrays of varying sizes and specifications to convert solar energy into   electricity  for their own use. SBSP attempts to use the same framework. However, under SBSP, after solar energy is converted to electricity, it is transmitted back to Earth   wirelessly , where it is then converted to electricity again. This method resembles how telecom satellites transmit TV signals. SBSP carries multiple advantages. Not only does it use existing technology, but it also allows the energy collected by solar panels to remain unaffected by cloudy weather conditions. Countries have started taking initiative to avail these advantages. China  has announced that it would be building a 1km long solar array along the geostationary orbit (‘GEO’) for SBSP, which would allow it to generate energy equivalent to the   Three-Gorges Dam , the world’s largest  hydroelectric power generator. At the same time, Japan has started its   OHISAMA Project , which aims to make Japan the first country to transmit solar energy from outer space back to Earth. Even the European Space Agency has started   SOLARIS  in an attempt to achieve SBSP. However, this is where the problem arises. Due to the ultra-hazardous  nature of space activities, SBSP infrastructure faces the same heightened risk of collisions as any other space object. This risk raises the question: Who is responsible for damages caused by accidents in space? The Outer Space Liability Regime The liability regime in outer space is grounded in two international legal provisions. First, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (‘Outer Space Treaty’); and second, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (‘Liability Convention’).  Article VI  of the Outer Space Treaty assigns international responsibility of the contracting states in a particular space activity, meaning that states must ensure that their outer space activities are consistent with international law. Article VII  imposes international liability on a state that launches or procures the launching of a space object, meaning that in the case a launching state’s space object causes damage to another, it will have the financial obligation to remedy the harm. Article VIII  of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that the state of registry retains responsibility for its space object. However, the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ( UNCOPUOS ) found this system inadequate for covering liability claims in space. As a result of this inadequacy, the UNCOPUOS  drafted the Liability Convention to extend   Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. More comprehensive than the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention provided different types of liability for space activities.  Article II  of the Liability Convention establishes absolute liability on the launching state for any damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth, and  Article III  imposes fault liability on the launching state for any damage caused elsewhere than the surface of the Earth. Damage caused to solar panels in outer space falls under Article III of the Liability Convention, and thus, is governed by fault liability. The Solar Panel Problem Under   Article III  of the Liability Convention, in the case that solar panels are damaged by another’s satellite, say the satellite of State X, the owner of the satellite in question must prove the following to claim damages: State X is the launching state of the space object that damaged the solar panel. State X was at ‘fault.’ There was proximate causation  between the fault of State X and the damage caused to the solar panel. The  difficulty in proving ‘fault’ in outer space has been widely discussed and deliberated. One of the ways ‘fault’ can be proved is by establishing proximate causation between the action and the damage caused using the but for test . To pass this test, the owner of the harmed solar panel must establish that the damage caused to their solar panel would not have occurred but for the fault of State X. The determinative problem here is that solar panels are highly prone to damage from externalities such as space junk in the form of small debris, defunct satellites, etc., in outer space. Currently,  estimates  reveal the existence of 34,000 pieces larger than 10 cm, 900,000 between 1 cm and 10 cm, and over 128 million fragments between 1 mm and 1 cm in LEO, with additional smaller debris that are untraceable. Travelling at 7.5 km/s, even tiny particles are  highly destructive . The  GEO  consists of larger pieces of debris, which are particularly dangerous due to their high speeds. These pieces of debris reduce the functionality of solar panels and carry the potential to make them defunct. This is evidenced by various instances, such as the reduction in the power output of Copernicus Sentinel-1A  when it was struck by a small untraceable piece of debris. Further, in the span of 4 years, approximately 40,000 particles greater than 10 microns impacted the solar arrays on the  Hubble Telescope , with the perforation caused by impact being several hundred times. Even the ISS  has recorded over 1,400 impacts from meteoroids, with predictions estimating a  degradation rate  up to 0.80%. Now, suppose State X’s space object negligently crashes into a solar panel, causing a loss or reduction of its functionality. In that case, State X can escape liability by adopting the defense that the solar panel lost its functionality, or faced a decrease in functionality, due to regular wear and tear over time. This defense stands to exacerbate existing gaps in the international liability regime, putting the owners of SBSP apparatus at a considerable disadvantage and preventing them from rightfully being able to claim damages under the Liability Convention. Conclusion Though the Liability Convention was established to enact a thorough liability regime in outer space, advances in technology and growing, untraceable debris in outer space are challenging its provisions. This debris stealthily deteriorates and damages the workings of solar panels. Consequently, in cases of negligent crashes, the only binding liability regime in outer space fails to be of any aid. This effectively leaves SBSP owners without any method to claim rightful damages and simultaneously provides a scot-free excuse for countries acting negligently. Minimizing legal gaps in the outer space liability regime is thus the need of the hour. Until technology develops to trace the untraceable, the Liability Convention must be amended to recognize the depreciation caused by debris. This amendment will help countries meet their carbon neutrality targets without undue and unclaimable losses. Until the amendment, it is recommended that countries take note of the current provisions governing liability in outer space, and mind the gaps!

Muhammad Mustafa Arif is a final-year LL.B. (Hons) candidate at Pakistan College of Law (University of London). He is a regular columnist for The News International and The Friday Times , and has contributed legal commentary and opinion pieces to LEAP Pakistan. Demonstrating a strong commitment to legal research and writing, he has interned at leading law firms including Awais Law DRT, Bhandari Naqvi Riaz, and Raja Muhammad Akram & Co. Photo By Emad El Byed The rapid development and deployment of autonomous weapons with Artificial Intelligence (AI) represent a great innovation in contemporary warfare. These weapons can recognize and attack targets independently upon activation, without further human intervention, as illustrated by the United States Department of Defense . Often portrayed as drones or robots, they represent a profound shift in warfare . Neil Davison, a senior scientific and policy adviser with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) , emphasized, “Autonomous weapons are not a product of science fiction in a far-off dystopian future. They are an immediate humanitarian concern and need an urgent, international political response.”   This problem is particularly salient in Gaza, where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have deployed AI-targeting systems, raising grave legal, ethical, and humanitarian issues. The deployment of devices such as “Lavender” and “Gospel” has underlined the need for universal international regulation to protect civilians and comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL).   Deployment of AI in Gaza   AI-powered autonomous weaponry has become a key player in modern warfare, raising serious ethical concerns. Israel has extensively incorporated AI into warfare, often using the Gaza Strip to develop and refine advanced military technologies before exporting them globally .   Israel has developed AI-based programs called “ Lavender ,” “ Gospel ,” and “ Where’s Daddy ? ,” which have played a critical role in identifying assassination targets.   Lavender is the most prominent AI-powered targeting system used by the IDF. It is designed to identify individuals associated with militant activities . It has been reported that, in the initial stages of the conflict, Lavender allegedly labeled 37,000 Palestinians as threat s . Further reports have indicated that the use of Lavender has contributed to thousands of civilian casualties .   Gospel is used primarily by the IDF to target buildings and infrastructure believed to be linked to militant groups. It assists the IDF in determining airstrike targets by analyzing intelligence inputs, satellite imagery, and intercepted communications. Reports suggest Gospel was involved in numerous strikes and contributed to significant casualties , though the exact number remains uncertain.   Where’s Daddy assists the IDF in monitoring individuals designated as high-priority targets . The system tracks the movements of such targets and notifies the forces when they reach home , increasing the likelihood of targeted strikes. According to reports from various platforms, the use of this tool has resulted in thousands of deaths, as it facilitates targeted killings that have often resulted in the deaths of family members and non-combatants in the vicinity.   In the ongoing conflict, Israel has heavily relied on AI to make life-or-death targeting decisions with minimal human involvement. It is pertinent to note that AI does not directly make decisions or cause the devastating events unfolding in Gaza. However, it heavily influences human decision-making due to cognitive bias. A key example is “ automation bias ,” where people overly trust machine-generated outputs and neglect to question or verify them, especially under time constraints. Similar to how ChatGPT cautions users that the system can make mistakes and they should double-check information, such caution is crucial in armed conflicts, as per the cardinal principle of distinction under IHL, which requires parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between civilian and military objects at all times. Over-reliance on AI tools in warfare without critical human oversight can lead to disastrous outcomes, including the unintended loss of civilian lives. This misplaced trust in AI magnifies risks and blurs the line between human judgment and machine error in critical situations.   Ethical Dilemmas :   AI has the potential to enhance nearly all aspects of military operations, from ‘strategic’ planning and troop deployment to personnel training. AI can optimize various warfare systems—including weapons, sensors, navigation, aviation support, and surveillance—by increasing operational efficiency and reducing reliance on human intervention. However, these systems must adhere to best practices and align with their specific functions.   Productivity : The United States , being the global leader in AI evolution, recognizes that war places immense physical and mental strain on soldiers, leading to fatigue and adverse medical conditions such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that can hinder focus, performance, and decision-making . This fatigue increases the risk of human error , potentially jeopardizing mission success and resulting in injuries or defeat.   AI, however, offers a solution by allowing soldiers to conserve their energy and allocate their time more efficiently, reducing the burden on them and improving overall effectiveness in the field. AI enhances decision-making by enabling more accurate data analysis, which improves targeting and reduces errors. Automated systems allow for quick decisions in combat, thereby minimizing mistakes. Drones and AI help identify and communicate potential threats , offering greater precision in detecting distant objects and providing a strategic advantage in preparing for attacks.   Over-Reliance : Lavender and Gospel utilize machine learning to differentiate between military targets, civilians, and civilian structures. However, if decision-makers act on their own without adequate scrutiny or supplementary information—an issue that has been reported —this could lead to attacks that harm the civilian population present. Typically, there is a “ human in the loop ” who reviews and approves or rejects AI recommendations. However, Israeli soldiers often treat these AI outputs as if they were human decisions, spending as little as twenty seconds reviewing a target before launching a strike. Army leadership reportedly encourages automatic approval of Lavender’s kill list, assuming its accuracy, even though Lavender has a minimum estimated error rate of 10% .   Guidelines for preventing civilian casualties emphasize patience in observation, as deliberate analysis leads to more informed decisions on lethal and non-lethal actions. Slowing decision-making is crucial in complex, high-stakes environments where rushed judgments obscure critical nuances. Military planning gives commanders time to assess the operational landscape, considering enemy forces, allies, civilians, and potential risks . As General Dwight D. Eisenhower observed, “ plans are useless, but planning is indispensable , ” emphasizing the value of thorough preparation in navigating unpredictable conflict scenarios.   Intersection of AI and International Humanitarian Law :   In addition to AI systems, Israel has also been deploying Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) and Semi-Autonomous Weapons (Semi-LAWS) in the ongoing conflict. There is currently no universally agreed-upon definition of LAWS under international law, though some advancements have been made toward establishing one . Broadly, LAWS refer to weapons that, once deployed, can independently identify and engage targets without human input . The IDF has established the use of remote-controlled quadcopters , equipped with machine guns and missiles, to “ surveil, terrorize, and kill ” civilians sheltering in tents, schools, hospitals, and residential areas. Those in the Nuseirat Refugee Camp in Gaza have reported that Israeli drones often broadcast sounds of crying babies and women to deceive the residents and draw them out to areas where they can more easily be targeted.   Under IHL, the IDF is obligated to adhere to the principles of Jus in Bello with distinction , proportionality , and precaution in attacks . The principle of distinction requires belligerents to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects and between combatants and civilians (Article 48 of Additional Protocol (AP) I to the Geneva Conventions (GC)). The principle of proportionality requires that an attack should not result in excessive civilian harm compared to the anticipated military advantage ( Article 51(5)(b) of AP I ). The principle of precautions in attack ( Article 57 of AP I ) requires armed forces to ensure that a target is a legitimate military objective and to suspend or seek delay with an attack if it becomes apparent that what they aim to do violates IHL. These requirements, through Customary International Law, are binding, whether human commanders or AI-Based systems make decisions, as responsibilities under IHL always rests with human operators and states .   The application of AI-based decision support systems since October 7th has claimed the lives of approximately 37,000 Palestinians , of whom many were civilians and children. The ICRC has pointed out that decisions on targets taken with the assistance of AI could result in civilian-military misidentification, which would violate the rule of distinction. Micheal Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher discuss the challenges of following principles of IHL by decision makers when deploying autonomous weapon systems. They note that reliance on AI for decision-making undermines proportionality , as current AI frameworks cannot generate well-informed human judgment concerning military gain at the expense of civilians. Failure to mitigate these dangers would render such AI-aided attacks illegal under IHL.   To clarify the potential dangers of AI-based military operations, the regulation of autonomous vehicles is a good analogy. Most jurisdictions forbid the use of fully autonomous driving systems on account of a 10% accident rate , deemed too high to ensure the safety of civilians. In the same vein, AI-targeting systems bear a 10% error rate , which provokes legitimate doubts about their ability to distinguish between military and civilian targets. Such an error rate significantly undermines respect for the principle of proportionality formulated in international law. In armed conflict, where decisions have long-term implications and the stakes involve matters of life and death, such errors lead to war crimes as formulated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court .   Autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are not regulated directly by current IHL treaties , although their employment remains subject to general principles of IHL, notably through the Martens Clause . Codified in Article 1(2) of AP I and the preamble to AP II , the Clause provides that in situations not regulated by specific law, civilians and combatants continue to be under the protection of “the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience .” These principles include , for example, the obligation to protect civilians from direct attack, prohibition of weapons causing unnecessary suffering, and the requirement to respect human dignity, which is challenged when machines are delegated autonomous decision-making without human oversight. Its purpose, confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (1996) , is to establish a normative floor where legal loopholes are absent.   This norm applies to AWS, which—unlike human combatants—lacks the capacity for moral judgment, situational empathy, or discretion in applying rules like proportionality and distinction. Autonomous weapons can potentially violate the Martens Clause, since autonomous weapons struggle to comply with principles of distinction and proportionality. The ICRC Commentary points out that the Martens Clause is appealing to “ elementary considerations of humanity ” when treaty law is ambiguous. These are precisely the considerations threatened by AWS: their reliance on algorithms based on incomplete or biased data risks arbitrary targeting, civilian casualties, and decision-making untethered from ethical accountability. Thus, whether AWS is lawful under IHL is not an issue of whether they are automatically forbidden, but whether their use undermines the humanitarian safeguards IHL intended to uphold. The Clause acts as a normative anchor, ensuring that even when rules are absent, the conduct of warfare remains bound by fundamental principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.   Most legal and moral frameworks assume that humans should make decisions involving the taking of life or imposing severe consequences. The Hague Convention (IV) (1907) stipulates that combatants have to be “ commanded by a person ,” thus underpinning the necessity of human control in warfare. Removing human decision-makers from lethal targeting processes violates adherence to IHL and international human rights law. The position that “removing humans from the loop risks removing humanity from the loop” has the support of state practice and opinion juris . In the absence of significant human control, AI-driven targeting platforms can violate the right to life since they lack the necessary decision-making capacity to assess proportionality and necessity.   Conclusion :   The integration of AI-driven technologies into modern warfare—particularly as witnessed in Gaza—presents profound legal, ethical, and humanitarian dilemmas that challenge the foundational principles of IHL. Given these legal deficiencies, regulatory measures must be implemented to ensure compliance with IHL. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems has proposed a legally binding instrument to govern the use of AI in warfare , emphasizing the necessity of human control over critical targeting decisions. This proposal and current interpretations of existing IHL principles can explicitly address the use of AI in armed conflict. States, too, must also incorporate AI-specific legal safeguards into their military doctrines to prevent violations of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.   AI-driven military systems pose unprecedented challenges to the principles of IHL. The evidence suggests that AI’s current error rates and inherent limitations in assessing proportionality render its use in lethal targeting operations highly problematic under existing legal frameworks. Without such reforms, the unchecked militarization of AI threatens not only to erode the protective shield of IHL but also to normalize a future where accountability for war crimes becomes diffuse and the value of human life is subjected to the fallibility of machines.

About the Author: Inika Dular is an undergraduate student at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, India. Image by Mathieu Stern available here Introduction Investment laws are the backbone of economic growth. They enable countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and foster domestic enterprise. India emerged as the fifth-best investment destination for CEOs worldwide in PwC India’s 28th Annual Global CEO Survey at Davos 2025. Sanjeev Krishan, Chairperson of PwC India, believes that CEOs still hold certain reservations about investing in India due to “ regulatory complexity .” India’s investment framework has often been termed inconsistent and self-contradictory . Challenges lie in its dispute resolution mechanisms, incentives, and taxation policies, all of which are frequently misaligned with international legal principles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s new investment laws , which replaced the Foreign Investment Law of 2000 in February, align with its Vision 2030 goals of uplifting its economy, society, and culture, and reflect a forward-thinking approach. This article explores key lessons India can take from Saudi Arabia’s new investment laws and the way forward for the nation’s FDI prospects, particularly in light of international investment law, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and global dispute resolution mechanisms. Learnings for Indian Investment Law from Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Arabia’s new investment laws exemplify an investor-centric approach consistent with its national economic goals. By analysing its key provisions, several areas emerge where India’s legal framework could benefit from reform. Dispute Resolution Challenges Indian investment law can draw significant lessons from Saudi Arabia’s innovative dispute resolution mechanisms. The Kingdom has established specialised courts under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID’s investor-state dispute settlement ( ISDS ) framework provides a neutral, internationally recognised mechanism for resolving investment disputes. This enhances legal certainty by ensuring binding arbitration, rather than relying on domestic courts that may be perceived as biased or inefficient by foreign investors. Saudi Arabia has made remarkable efforts towards achieving a seamless dispute resolution framework, as reflected in its recent agreement with ICSID declaring the Saudi Centre for Commercial Arbitration as its exclusive centre. The framework promotes adherence to principles such as Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and protection from expropriation, both of which are essential for maintaining investor confidence. These provisions reduce FDI risks and promote a predictable business environment. Additionally, the new Saudi law introduces investment-related Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms under Article 10 , offering investors flexibility and business-friendly avenues for resolving disputes.   In contrast, investment disputes in India are often routed through overburdened civil courts , resulting in delays and higher costs. For example, the World Bank’s 2024 Ease of Doing Business rankings estimate India’s average commercial dispute resolution time at 1,445 days , compared to Saudi Arabia’s 575 days . Despite India’s enactment of the Commercial Courts Act (2015 ), its impact remains limited . Moreover, India’s withdrawal from ISDS in new bilateral investment treaties reduces investor protection, making the country less attractive to foreign investors. India is not a signatory to the ICSID Convention and has moved from ISDS towards a 2015-approved BIT model . While India's 2015 Model BIT retains ISDS, it requires investors to exhaust local remedies for 5 years and narrows the definition of protected investments to exclude portfolio investments, making international arbitration much harder to access compared to traditional BITs.   To make dispute resolution more effective, India should strive to align its international arbitration framework with the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration , which provides a uniform legal structure for fair and efficient arbitration. The model law strengthens investor confidence by ensuring procedural transparency, party autonomy, and enforceability of arbitral awards under the New York Convention, to which India is a signatory. This would help India balance its obligations under BITs while also reducing the threat of protracted litigation. Taxation Challenges and Investor Confidence India should also consider exploring tax policy reforms in line with recent developments in Saudi Arabia’s investment law. Saudi Arabia has aligned its tax policies with OECD’s international tax standards , particularly the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) framework, which aims to prevent tax avoidance by multinational enterprises and uphold global investment protection principles under BITs. Additionally, the Kingdom’s pro-investor, incentivised tax regime tackles bureaucratic hurdles and offers long-term stability guarantees. Its new Investment Law includes tax exemptions for up to 30 years in some sectors. These stable taxation policies contribute to investor confidence and predictability in Saudi Arabia.   India, in contrast, has had a history of retrospective taxation, which must be addressed to assure investors of a stable regulatory environment. Retrospective taxation is inconsistent with the FET standard under BITs. This standard requires host states to maintain legal stability and predictability. However, retrospective tax amendments, like the Finance Act 2012 , discourage foreign investors and lead to costly international arbitration cases against India. The Act empowered the government to impose a capital gains tax retrospectively on foreign investors by clarifying terms in the Income Tax Act 1961 . This led to major investment disputes such as Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India (2012) – later also argued before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague – and Cairn Energy Plc v. Government of India (2020) , both of which were adjudicated against India in international arbitration. These outcomes damaged investor confidence because of uncertainty and unpredictability.    Although the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act 2021 , which repealed the retrospective tax on indirect asset transfers, provided some relief, further reforms are essential. India should consider implementing Saudi-style tax stability agreements and binding advance rulings to prevent abrupt policy shifts, aligning with the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) . This would help attract long-term FDI while reducing legal disputes and enhancing clarity in tax administration. Bureaucratic Impediments India’s investment regulatory framework is governed by the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) 1999 and sector-specific policies . Bureaucratic delays and inconsistent legal interpretations continue to undermine the effectiveness of India’s FDI framework. The prevalence of bureaucratic delays and inconsistent legal interpretations has marred the whole FDI process. Conversely, Saudi Arabia’s single-window clearances and digital platforms boost efficiency in attracting FDI by streamlining regulatory processes. Following a centralized approach for approval, licensing, and regulatory compliance, the Kingdom’s Invest Saudi platform has contributed to a reduction in processing times and is targeting a twentyfold increase in FDI by 2030 . In its Vision 2030 program, Saudi Arabia has introduced several streamlined investment procedures to facilitate the establishment and operation of businesses.   Meanwhile, India’s current system requires investors to navigate multiple authorities, including the Reserve Bank of India and the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade , leading to inefficiencies. While the automatic route for FDI avoids some approvals, it is not sufficient. India should build on its Digital India progra m to develop a comprehensive single-window approach that enhances predictability, transparency, and regulatory speed, fostering a more attractive investment climate.   Unequal Treatment Lastly, India imposes sectoral caps and restrictive conditions on FDI, creating a fragmented and protectionist environment. For instance, India’s 2020 Consolidated FDI Policy restricts FDI in multi-brand retail to 51%, subject to government approval and mandatory 30% local sourcing requirements. Such regulatory hindrances and deliberate complexities have deterred global players such as Walmart and Carrefour from expanding in India. India’s full investment potential and enhanced global competitiveness can be achieved by adopting investor-friendly policies, such as reducing sectoral restrictions and promoting regulatory predictability, to foster long-term economic growth.   Saudi Arabia’s new law guarantees equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors. Additionally, the law aims to eliminate excessive regulatory burdens to facilitate seamless foreign participation. The Kingdom has also relaxed and liberalised its Negative List ( Annex (B) ) over the years to attract more investment. Negative List refers to a document outlining specific industries where foreign investment is restricted, prohibited, or subject to special regulations. India’s restrictions on foreign investments warrant reconsideration in light of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures , which prohibits investment measures that restrict trade, such as local content requirements and trade-balancing measures.   The Way Forward for India In light of PwC India’s survey at Davos 2025 , now is the time for transformation. Meaningful reforms can help bridge the gaps between India’s and Saudi Arabia’s investment regimes and unlock India’s full economic potential. Saudi Arabian investment law demonstrates how a strategic framework can instill investor confidence, legal certainty, and efficiency in regulatory processes. India should consider adopting a similar approach to ensure its competitiveness as an investment hub.   The road ahead calls for a holistic approach; India should implement regulatory reforms by employing a single-window clearance and digitisation system, thereby accelerating approvals and eliminating bureaucratic hurdles. Equally important is the need for reform in the taxation system, along with the implementation of stability agreements and advance ruling systems to prevent arbitrary changes. Sector-specific incentives in special economic zones should be revived to attract high-end investments in emerging industries. Alongside investment dispute resolution, investor confidence will be strengthened through dedicated commercial investment courts and effective enforcement of arbitration awards. Finally, equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors will position India as a fair and transparent investment destination. Aligning with global best practices will empower India to emerge as a preferred and resilient destination for global capital.

About the Author: Lilit Arakelyan is a first-year law student and incoming Senior Articles Editor with the Berkeley Journal of International Law. Before law school, she studied international policy, classical studies, and engaged in human rights initiatives. At Berkeley Law, she has been exploring her interest in intellectual property law, and continues her work in human rights investigations at the Berkeley Law Human Rights Center. Photo by   Kelly Sikkema  on   Unsplash Canada’s investigation into social media platform X over its use of personal data to train Grok , its artificial intelligence (AI) model, encapsulates the tension between innovation and privacy rights in the evolving landscape of AI large language models (LLMs). The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) launched an investigation into whether X collected, used, or disclosed Canadians’ personal information  to train its AI chatbot without users’ consent. The inquiry was initiated following a complaint by a member of the Canadian Parliament who raised concerns about X’s use of Canadians’ data to train the chatbot to influence users’ political decisions . Shortly after, Ireland’s Data Protection Commission initiated  its own investigation into Grok’s training practices. Given the lack of AI-related laws, these parallel investigations highlight the legal ambiguity surrounding the use of personal data to train AI models. While countries like the United States emphasize the economic promise of AI development and discourage regulation of training practices, the European Union imposes substantial penalties against AI companies found in violation of  its privacy frameworks, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its  pioneering Artificial Intelligence Act  (AI Act). Countries considering implementing AI-specific legal frameworks for the first time face the choice of determining what enforcement mechanisms to enact for effecting deterrence of the misuse of personal data: whether to follow the EU model and impose large financial penalties , or to rely on softer enforcement mechanisms, like compliance agreements and reputational consequences , under Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).  The U.S.’s pro-growth economic  stance raises the question of whether  legal frameworks can compel private companies to stop misusing personal data without imposing costs that may “ stifle private sector innovation .” Thus, as these platforms are marketed as operating for the public’s benefit, policymakers may also grapple with the dilemma of  whether protecting individual privacy risks undermining the public good that these technologies aim to serve. What is Grok? Grok is an AI assistant developed by Elon Musk’s artificial intelligence company, xAI , to help X users accomplish tasks such as “ answering questions, solving problems, and brainstorming .” One week before Canada’s investigation, xAI  introduced Grok-3 , its“ Humorous AI Assistant. ” According to its website, X states that Grok was pre-trained using “a variety of data  from publicly available sources and data sets,” which were assessed and organized by human reviewers. xAI also indicates that it may utilize users’ X data from their profiles, posts, and engagement statistics to boost Grok’s understanding of human language communication, ability to provide accurate and engaging responses, “sense of humor and wit,”  and ability to remain politically unbiased .  The Grok investigations illuminate the tension between public and private value. Although LLM models like Grok promise public benefit, they are often trained on user-contributed data that was not provided for LLM and AI training purposes with informed consent . This practice raises important legal concerns under privacy law frameworks about the point at which leveraging large amounts of unfiltered personal data for technological innovation becomes unlawful exploitation, and even hinder innovation . Canada’s Privacy Framework: PIPEDA and Voluntary Standards At the federal level, Canadians’ privacy rights are anchored by the PIPEDA , which governs private-sector use of personal data, broadly defined as any information about an identifiable individual . Enacted over 20 years ago, the PIPEDA sets out ten Fair Information Principles,  including requirements for meaningful consent, purpose limitation, and security safeguards proportional to the relevant data’s sensitivity. However, the act’s enforcement can lack bite: the OPC can issue their findings, recommendations  for further prosecution, and a $100,000 CAD fine, but the greatest punitive force of the OPC’s investigations often relies not on sanctions, but the reputational costs that will likely follow. In contrast, the EU’s GDPR authorizes fines up to €20 million  or 4 % of their total global turnover, whichever is higher, for data protection breaches. Canada’s recent attempt to modernize its privacy and AI laws culminated in Bill C-27 , which included the proposed Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) . AIDA sought to regulate “high-impact” AI systems and impose duties on developers, deployers, and managers to mitigate risks, aiming to ensure that “ Canadians can trust the digital technologies that they use every day .” However, the bill had several debated aspects , excluding protections against public sector use of AI, and leaving many details, such as the definition of “high-impact,” to be determined through future regulation. After more than two years in legislative limbo, AIDA died on the Order Paper in early 2025 after the prorogation of Parliament , leaving Canada without an AI-specific statutory framework. Non-Legislative Approaches In the absence of statutory reform, Canada has turned to institutional and voluntary mechanisms to guide the future regulation of AI. One such initiative is the Canadian Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute  (CAISI), which launched in 2024 with a $50 million budget. As part of Canada’s broader $2.4 billion national AI strategy , CAISI focuses on research into the safe development of AI systems and collaborates internationally on risk mitigation efforts. Canada has also introduced a Voluntary Code of Conduct on Generative AI , which dozens of companies have signed,  pledging to follow best practices. Canada’s investigation into X signals that the OPC interprets the training of AI models on personal data as a “use” of that data that must comply with the PIPEDA’s rules on consent, purpose limitation, and transparency, indicating a willingness to assert regulatory oversight through existing frameworks even in the absence of new legislation. Comparative Perspective: Europe and the United States On the international AI regulatory landscape, the EU takes the lead with the GDPR  and the AI Act . The GDPR already covers AI training when personal data is involved and allows regulators to impose multimillion-euro fines, such as Italy’s sanction against OpenAI  in 2024. The more recent AI Act, enacted in 2024 , marks a landmark shift in global AI governance. While the GDPR focuses on protecting individual rights in relation to personal data, the AI Act functions more like a product safety law , designed to ensure the secure technical development and deployment of AI systems. It categorizes AI tools by risk level and imposes strict compliance obligations for high-risk use cases, such as systems used in employment, law enforcement, or critical infrastructure. It also includes specific duties for general-purpose AI models, like those powering large language systems. Because of its extraterritorial reach, the AI Act applies to any company, regardless of location, that markets or implements AI systems within the EU.  Unlike the EU’s structured regulatory regime, the US takes a decentralized, flexible approach to AI governance . Many of the world’s most prominent AI firms—including X, Google, and OpenAI—are U.S. based, yet the country lacks a federal AI or comprehensive privacy law.  In 2023, the Biden administration issued an Executive Order on AI  urging Congress to enact data privacy legislation. The order emphasized responsible innovation, public protection, and privacy-preserving techniques, including the use of AI methods that enable model training without compromising the privacy of the underlying data. However, in 2025, the Trump administration issued a new Executive Order  on AI policy that shifted the focus from protecting users toward scaling AI technology. Now, the government emphasizes enabling high-quality training operations to be executed by applicants or their partners. While it called for setting new technical standards and security protocols, the order did not directly address privacy-preserving innovation.  Consequently, U.S. regulatory efforts remain fragmented. State laws attempt to fill the regulatory gap, for example, California’s CCPA  grants consumers the right to limit the sale and use of their personal data. In 2026, Colorado’s AI Act  will become the first comprehensive state-level legislation focused on regulating AI systems. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission relies on its consumer protection authority, while the National Institute of Standards and Technology ( NIST ) has developed a voluntary AI Risk Management Framework.  International Implications and Regulatory Convergence The investigation into X’s use of Canadians’ personal data for AI training serves as a microcosm of the legal challenges posed by artificial intelligence, highlighting the ongoing tension between technological progress and the adequacy of existing legal safeguards for users’ privacy and security. Canada’s current framework provides important protections that apply to AI platforms’ use of personal information, such as consent, purpose limitation, transparency, and security obligations. Yet, Canada’s legislature could not imagine the scale and complexity of AI training capabilities when it passed the PIPEDA or other relevant provincial laws. As a result, the PIPEDA do not sufficiently tackle all the legal challenges that rapid AI development may pose, especially when current frameworks are limited  in their enforcement powers. The stalled reforms in Bill C-27 leaves Canada relying on 20th-century legislation to tackle 21st-century AI issues, even as it champions AI ethics on the world stage .  Ultimately, achieving the balance between industry interests and adequate privacy protections is key. However, as these investigations demonstrate, whether states defer to industry interests, impose large fines, or settle compliance agreements, in a global AI race, no country regulates in isolation . The outcome of Ireland’s investigation will test once again whether the EU’s AI Act is sufficient to regulate how easily companies like X can use user data to develop their AI systems, although Ireland’s investigation comes one year after it’s previous case against X, which ended when the company agreed to stop training its AI systems using personal data collected from EU users . The question remains whether frameworks like the PIPEDA, despite lacking AI-specific  provisions or weighty financial punitive authority, can be effectively enforced to address cutting-edge AI training practices and protect against the exploitation of user data.  Yet, no matter how far-reaching the legal architecture, providing users the opportunity to opt out of the use of their data from LLM training models is a prudent exercise of corporate responsibility . The debate over AI growth and data privacy protections may not be settled by law or regulation, but by culture, as users who grew up in a world of mindless data exchange accept “information altruism” as the cost of participation . Laws safeguard interests that society deems protectable, but as users increasingly acquiesce to sharing even their most sensitive data, even voluntarily uploading their medical scans to Grok , experts are raising alarms. Amid growing reliance on AI, it remains uncertain whether new legal frameworks will emerge, or whether existing privacy protections will withstand evolving technological pressures.

About the Author: Liam Roche , LL.B., is a Master of Laws (LL.M. 2025) candidate at UC Berkeley School of Law, specializing in law and technology, advanced international law, attribution, and the regulation of non-state entities under international legal frameworks. He has published in several outlets, including Lawyers Without Borders, on topics such as international law, the protection of fundamental rights, and gaps in international accountability standards. Image Credit: U.S.A. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Introduction Nearly five years have passed since the first signing of the Artemis Accords , a multilateral, international agreement  outlining critical principles in relation to activities in space. The instrument has been heralded by many parties as being a catalyst for substantial development  for the field of space law in the modern context. Despite this, however, the Artemis Accords have a number of remaining gaps and ambiguities which bring their efficacy into question. This post will examine the Artemis Accords in their present state and analyze the remaining gaps in the field of international space law. Finally, it will assess how these gaps could be clarified and remedied in international law to ensure critical principles of space use and exploration are upheld. Background The Artemis Accords are only the latest in a series of international agreements and treaties surrounding the use and control of space and its resources. The first of these, and the one which laid the groundwork for the modern international space law, was the Outer Space Treaty of 1967  (OST). The instrument was largely a response to the space race between the USA and USSR along with the growing fear that countries could use their rapid development of space technology to place weapons systems in space. The OST outlined several core principles governing national activities in outer space, including: the prohibition of national appropriation or sovereignty claims over celestial bodies; the freedom of all nations to explore space; the responsibility of states for national activities conducted in space; and a ban on the placement of weapons of mass destruction or other weapons in orbit.  Next, the Moon Agreement  (MA), which was introduced in 1979 and currently has seventeen parties, was a further specification on the regulations afforded by the OST with respect to specific activities on the moon and other celestial bodies. This instrument was largely a restatement of the OST with specific focus placed onto scientific operations. However, it contained additional clarifications regarding subsurface operations on the moon as well.  Finally, the Registration Treaty  (RT), introduced in 1974, has since been signed by over seventy nations. This treaty contains specific obligations for the reporting of launched objects into space. The treaty requires that parties disclose the name of the launching State, an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number, the date and territory or location of launch, and the object’s function.  A New Era of Space and Space Law Following the introduction of these international instruments, there has been an immense boom in the use of space and space activities generally. New nations  have begun conducting space activities, international collaborative efforts  in space have become more mainstream with initiatives like the International Space Station, and private actors have begun to play a much more central role in the outer space context. With these developments, alongside the substantial technological advancements, the treaties have become increasingly important instruments in international law. However, although they represented a significant step forward at the time, the treaties and agreements have not kept pace with modern challenges. Gaps and ambiguities have emerged, highlighting the pressing need to modernize the treaties for contemporary adaptation.  Enter Artemis The Artemis Accords (2020), a multilateral agreement between nations concerning the use of space, have marked a significant development in the field. They provide modern clarifications to the OST, building on the foundations established by both the OST and MA. Additionally, the Accords introduce new and specific standards and interpretations for space activities.  Collaboration & Transparency The Accords lay out a number of methods by which international collaboration on space efforts can be facilitated. Firstly, the parties agree to establish standards for technologies used in space— an effort aimed at unifying and streamlining operations while also increasing the accessibility of space for scientific discovery, exploration, and innovation.  Registration & Debris Management In addition, the Accords address what has become a growing problem in space: orbital debris and object registration. With the amount of space activity increasing, the problem of “space junk” and knowing precisely where and what objects are in space has become an increasingly present concern. To this end, the Artemis Accords have outlined commitments to limit the amount of harmful debris and establish a standardized and unified registration system which complies with the Registration Treaty.  Space Resources Finally, and most significantly, the Accords outline a novel interpretation of the OST concerning the use and appropriation of resources. The most relevant provision in this area is section 10(2) which states that “[t]he Signatories affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation”. This is in reference to Article II of the OST which prohibits national appropriation by claim of sovereignty or otherwise.  By incorporating this provision, the signatories clarify their interpretation of Article II as  addressing only territorial claims of complete sovereignty and not resource appropriation. This marks a significant development as it paves the way for nations and private industry to engage in resource extraction from asteroids, other planets, and additional celestial bodies through mining operations.  Remaining Issues Despite these clarifications and refinements to existing law, the Artemis Accords do not wholly iron out the creases present in the OST and subsequent international instruments. Peaceful Purposes The Accords have put forward that they are only binding on operations conducted in the context of peaceful purposes. This limitation is noteworthy, as the scope of what constitutes “peaceful use” has remained a significant and unresolved issue since the adoption of the OST. As mentioned, the OST outlaws the placement of weapons in outer space, including weapons of mass destruction. One issue under the OST is the possibility of a space-based missile interception system such as the SDI proposed by President Ronald Reagan in 1983 and whether such a system could be classified as a “weapon” under the instrument. As the term is not defined, it does bring into question whether a defensive military asset could be classified as  such. The Artemis Accords, by expressly stating so in Section 3, do not address this issue at all, leaving it to be determined by a potential future international treaty. Private Industry Another critical gap the Artemis Accords have failed to regulate is the role of private companies  in the modern landscape of space activity. While the accords acknowledge the existence of these actors in multiple sections—for example, Section 8 concerning the release of scientific data expressly states that it “is not intended to apply to private sector operations unless such operations are being conducted on behalf of a Signatory”—they stop short of imposing concrete obligations. This omission is significant, as neither the OST nor other instruments provide for clear regulations on the obligations of non-state entities, such as requirements to register, cooperate, or even restrict their activities in space . Non-Binding Most critically, while the Artemis Accords modernize international space law in several respects—particularly by clarifying aspects of the OST and other instruments—they are not legally binding. By using language including “intend” and “note” among others, the Accords are able to form what is effectively a unified outlook on space activities and a collective interpretation of outer space law without creating any direct obligations or establishing any frameworks by which disputes or issues could be resolved.  Conclusion To conclude, it is undeniable that the Artemis Accords have marked a substantial new era of outer space regulation and international space law. The Accords present a unified set of principles, interpret existing instruments in a modern setting, and outline how conduct in space can adhere to international legal principles in today’s rapidly evolving space race. However, they are not binding and fail to address immense issues— including the classification of military assets as weapons under the OST and the obligations of private companies and other non-state entities operating in space. Because of these glaring omissions and the lack of a comprehensive framework in which these gaps can be addressed, the field of international space law remains largely unsettled. Despite appearances, the Artemis Accords do not constitute the binding treaty needed to govern the current and future use of space.

About the Author: Laiba Imran recently completed her Bachelor of Laws degree with Honors at the Pakistan College of Law, Punjab University. During her time as a student, she served as President of the Debating Society. She is currently the Director and Research Associate at the Technology Law Research Society, a non-partisan and non-profit think tank in Pakistan focusing on the intersection of law and technology. Laiba has also worked as an intern at the Chamber of Advocates Supreme Court Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan, and at esteemed law firms, including the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Pakistan, Minto & Mirza, and AUC | Law. Her publications address critical societal issues in Pakistan, incl uding minor children, youth, and democracy, unilateral divorce, and gender-based inequities. With a foundation in legal drafting and analytical skills, Laiba is committed to bringing about meaningful change in Pakistan, particularly in areas where women face systemic injustice.   She can be reached at  laibaimran8500@gmail.com . Since Israel initiated its military aggression in Gaza on October 7, 2023, or the Nakba of 1948, Palestinians have been confronted with a dystopian reality. Despite the ongoing situation in Gaza, Israel has categorically denied all allegations of human rights violations and genocide, asserting that its military is " the most moral in the world ." Israel employs well-worn strategies to obfuscate its transgressions by denying the humanity of its targets. The systematic dehumanization of Palestinians through the use of a " language of genocide " bears resemblance to previous instances in which groups have been targeted with similar rhetoric, such as the " merciless Indian savages " in America or the " untermenschen non-Aryans " in Europe. Indeed, dehumanization constitutes an integral phase in the commission of genocide. The process of dehumanization serves to mitigate ethical reservations concerning the act of killing, as it enables the perception of the victims as no longer human and, consequently, as being different from us and inferior. This phenomenon is exemplified by the cheers from Israeli citizens, encouraging the devastation in Gaza, and the chanting of " Death to Arabs " with other racist slogans. Furthermore, there is the incitement of racism by the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) and Israeli leaders. These instances underscore Israel's strategic employment of state-sanctioned hate to nurture societal acceptance for the ongoing genocide in Gaza.   This analysis examines Israel's actions in Gaza after October 7, 2023, contextualizing them within International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the wider legal and moral implications. It is imperative to acknowledge that legal principles are non-reciprocal, meaning that they apply regardless of the opposing party's actions. Attributing blame to the actions of another party, citing imbalances of power, or other forms of injustice, cannot justify violations of these principles, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians or the imposition of collective punishment.   Key Principles of International Humanitarian Law The Swiss government formally established International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with the 1864 Geneva Convention and has since evolved significantly. By the late 20th century, IHL enshrined several key humanitarian principles, including: The distinction between civilians and combatants The protection of those hors de combat (i.e., “out of action due to injury or damage”) The prohibition of unnecessary suffering The principles of necessity and proportionality These principles are designed to protect civilian lives and preserve human dignity, even in the context of armed conflict. From Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977): Article 48 (Basic Rule): "Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives." Article 41(2): "A person is hors de combat if: (a) He is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) He clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) He has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself."   According to the modern perspective articulated by Theodor Meron , a former judge for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) , the “humanitarian rights system directly addresses the responsibility of governments vis-a-vis populations over which they exercise power, authority, or jurisdiction, largely regardless of nationality.” The purpose of international law is to prevent any state from pursuing only its own national interests at the expense of human dignity or integrity , and to hold states accountable when they do so. This framework is equally applicable to unequal and asymmetric party relationships , like the dynamic between Israel, the occupier, and Palestine, the occupied state. Article 42 of the Fourth Hague Convention defines an occup ied territory as one that is “ placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” An d an occupying power is a foreign state that assumes unconsented-to effective control over a territory to which it has no sovereign title.” A “belligerent occupation” is one in which “the occupying power exercises provisional and temporary control over [a] foreign territory.” By th ese definitio ns , Israel has belligerently occupied Palestine since 1967 , a status affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its July 19, 2024, Advisory Opinion .   Because Israel is an occupying power under IHL, it is bound by certain duties towards the population, and it is not permitted to acquire sovereignty over the territory. Israel has a dual obligation to protect the lives and property of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and to respect their sovereignty . In addition, I HL prohibits specific tactics of war and attacks on vulnerable groups , including children, civilians , and the wounded or sick.   International Law Violations in Gaza Preservation of Life and Property It is evident that Israel has not fulfilled its legal obligations in accordance with the laws of belligerent occupation, outlined in Articles 42-56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations , the Fourth Geneva Convention , and Additional Protocol I , by not pursuing the preservation of life and property. In contrast to the preservation of the lives of Palestinian children and sick or injured civilians, Israel has employed carpet-bombing tactics in densely populated areas of Gaza, including the Jabalia Refugee Camp, Khan Younis, Deir el-Balah, and most recently, Rafah, designated as the last "safe zone ." Consequently, according to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, more than 50,000 Palestinians have been killed since Israel launched its military offensive on October 7 in the wake of deadly Hamas attacks. The cumulative effects of Israel’s war on Gaza could mean the true death toll could reach more than 186,000 people . Furthermore, the use of heavy munitions, including dumb bombs, bunker busters, thermobaric bombs, and white phosphorus , many of which are prohibited under international law , has further exacerbated the devastation. These operations, justified by Israel as necessary to eliminate Hamas , have resulted in the deliberate targeting of children, pregnant women, and medical patients with live ammunition and targeted air strikes. Survivors' testimonies reveal other violations such as field executions, detention , and enforced disappearances in military detention centers such as Sde Teiman , and the use of mass graves for its 'Ghost' operation in Gaza. The IDF has treated Palestinian abductees like " animals ,” refusing to distinguish between innocent civilians and armed combatants. In addition to deliberately targeting civilians, Israel has also violated Article 56 and 57 of the Fourth Geneva Convention by purposefully destroying and damaging civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, including Gaza’s largest functioning medical center Al-Shifa Hospital , United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools and universities ,   orphanages , and Gaza’s only functioning wheat mill and water plant . Israel's deliberate targeting of civilian welfare structures has led to the near-total collapse of the social fabric of Gaza and pushed millions of people to the brink of famine. Such attacks constitute grave war crimes under Article 54 of the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which prohibits “starvation as a method of warfare.” Moreover, Israel's decision to target protected buildings, such as educational institutions, hospitals, and historical monuments , also constitutes a serious crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute .   Economic Warfare and Humanitarian Crisis The concept of respecting sovereign rights entails the acknowledgement of a state's legitimate authority over its territory and resources. However, the status of Gaza remains a subject of contention, with various parties contending that it is a sovereign entity and others asserting that it is under occupation. As of 2007, Israel has kept Palestine under a strict military and commercial blockade, a form of economic warfare that has turned Gaza into "the largest open-air prison in the world. " In 2024, t he ICJ ruled that Israel's presence in the Palestinian territories is unlawful , thereby emphasizing that Israel lacks the right to exercise sovereignty over these regions.   Despite the ruling, Israel continues to enforce strict blockades. The Israeli border control has prohibited the entry of numerous essential items , including cement, tar, irrigation pipes, and fabric, into Gaza. These materials are crucial for the reconstruction of structures that were partially or wholly destroyed during Operation Cast Lead , a 22-day military offensive that resulted in significant fatalities in Gaza in 2009. This policy was most recently reviewed by Israeli authorities to enforce a total siege of the Strip following the events of 7 October .   Israeli border control has also withheld critical medical supplies , including anesthetics, anesthesia machines, oxygen cylinders, ventilators, water filtration systems, cancer medications, water purification tablets, and maternity kits. In May 2024, over 15,000 tons of their relief supplies awaited Israeli approval to enter Gaza. These restrictions have had a profoundly detrimental humanitarian impact on the civilian population in Gaza, severely impeding their ability to rebuild and access essential healthcare services at a time when 96% of the water from Gaza's sole aquifer is unfit for human consumption and children's access to water and sanitation in Gaza continues to be restricted and insufficient . There are also numerous instances of acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, and jaundice .   This obstruction of humanitarian assistance, coupled with targeting aid workers, further violates IHL. According to the UN, up to 254 aid workers have been deliberately targeted since the beginning of Israeli aggression on Gaza, a serious violation of IHL under Article 8(2)(b)(iii) of the Rome Statute . Moreover, Israel has made allegations of involvement in terrorism against UNRWA, along with the countries that provide financial support to the organization, without providing evidence to substantiate these claims. These allegations aim to hinder UNRWA's and other countr ies’ operations in the Gaza Strip. A New Look at International Law Despite appeals for accountability, international mechanisms recognize certain limitations. On November 21, 2024, resulting from an inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two high-ranking Israeli officials: Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, Israel’s former Minister of Defense.   However, it is crucial to acknowledge the intricacies of the legal process and the need to address the systemic causes of conflict, such as economic, political, and military hegemony, which have been responsible for seven decades of military occupation, ethnic cleansing, and economic warfare. Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) reluctance to swiftly pass a resolution regarding Gaza is attributable to political pressures from the United States . At the time of composing this article, the United States had utilized its veto power forty-six times to block resolutions that addressed Israel or supported Palestinian statehood.   For an extended period, Israel has strategically employed the terms " self-defense ," " terrorism ," and " antisemitism " to maneuver within the global political landscape, effectively countering the demands of the Palestinian people. It has presented a unilateral and partial interpretation of international law, ultimately shaping the international order in its favor. This strategic approach has reshaped the rules-based international order to serve as a means to an end for various geopolitical agendas. Notably, despite the gravity of the transgressions—namely genocide , annexation , and apartheid —Israel continues to operate within an alternative rules-based order that affords it a degree of protection.   In the aftermath of October 7th, the Gaza conflict has given rise to a novel unipolar paradigm within the global legal order, one that is predicated on the principles of victor’s justice and global inaction. It is imperative to examine the rationale behind a state's ability to profess adherence to legal principles while simultaneously disparaging international bodies and displaying impunity for their genocidal actions. The international community's apparent paralysis and inability to halt the ongoing genocide in Gaza have exposed the inherent limitations of international law, whether intentional or not. This situation underscores the pressing need for a new order free from the constraints of "security" hegemony, jurisdiction restrictions, and political actors. Preserving the sanctity of life demands the implementation of such a new order.

About the Author: Laurel Fletcher is the Chancellor’s Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Global Rights Innovation Lab Clinic, UC Berkeley School of Law and the 2025 Recipient of Riesenfeld Award. This Article is a transcript of her recipient speech from the 2025 Riesenfeld Symposium: Lawyering for Peace. Introduction I am so grateful to Berkeley Journal of International Law for honoring me with this year’s Riesenfeld Award. I remember sitting in the audience when Professor David Caron received the first Riesenfeld Award. This was soon after I started teaching at Berkeley. I remember so clearly my sense of awe listening to David and his accomplishments and feeling the impossibility of bridging the distance between what I could hope to achieve and a contribution that would be worthy of similar recognition. I am humbled that you have placed me in the company of past awardees and leaders in the field including the two here tonight: Professor Richard Buxbaum and Judge Joan Donoghue. I admire each so deeply. I. Human Rights in Time of Global Realignment I must begin by noting that I’m receiving this award at a moment when the foundations of the international world order are under assault. The United States is reconfiguring a world security regime based on this country’s historic alliance with democracies. The President undermines international law with talk of acquiring Canada, Gaza, Greenland, and the Panama Canal. Signaling a retreat from European allies, it appears US foreign policy will be dictated by a narrow view of self-interest and raw power. We are facing a very grim new international world order. In this one, which our colleague Professor David Grewal terms “ nuclear Westphalia ,” [1] the only States with full rights of sovereignty are those with nuclear weapons. Those without? They will either look to develop nuclear capability or seek security guarantees through States that do.   In this very sobering moment, I’d like to address the contemporary role of international law and lawyers. I do so by suggesting that we need to accept some hard truths as we make our way forward. A.     The conventional ways of defending international human rights are outmoded. The modern human rights movement can proudly trace its rise in international influence to exposing the truth of government repression and terror by condemning those abuses as violations of international law. In the past, within a world order knit together by the rule of law, Amnesty International (hereinafter as Amnesty) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) pioneered naming and shaming tactics to draw international attention to human rights violations. In an era when a State’s global legitimacy was tied to its compliance with international law, nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty and HRW could leverage monitoring and reporting to great effect. Yet the world has changed, and this model is no longer fit for purpose. International law and institutions face the challenges of regulating actors and phenomena for which the system was not designed. International law takes the formal sovereignty of States as its organizing principle. Our institutions were not designed to address the diffuse, transboundary, and destructive effects of the climate emergency, the power of Big Tech and digital technology, or abuses committed by multinational corporations. These threats to human freedoms are only accelerated by the rise of authoritarianism and the abandonment by powerful States of a commitment to the idea of truth that can be shown by facts. This Administration has moved from “alternative facts” [2] to “counter-factual facts.” Yesterday’s democratically elected leader defending their country against invasion becomes today’s dictator. [3] The United States, once the democratic world’s most powerful State, is no longer a reliable ally. B.     International lawyers need to develop new theories and strategies suited to the new global moment As someone whose career trajectory roughly coincides with what HRW founder Aryeh Neier refers to as “ a golden age ” [4] of human rights, it is painful to come to terms with where we are today. I think back to just over ten years ago when the Secretary General of the United Nations declared we were in the age of accountability . [5] It seems like ancient history. It certainly feels like a bygone era. If naming and shaming States into compliance is no longer the potent tool it once was, what comes next? I see hopeful signs for the continued relevance of international rights. We have seen exciting developments where advocates used courts to develop international law to address the climate emergency [6] in domestic contexts. Scholars and activists in the Global South are using intersectional approaches — advancing pluralistic interpretations of rights that encompass Indigenous epistemologies and building what may be called not universal but pluriversal rights . [7] It is exciting to see North-South coalitions using human rights frameworks and institutions to address systemic economic inequality. None of these strategies rely on exposing violations as their primary vehicle to change the world. All of them are using international law as part of social movement mobilizations, leveraging the differential power [8] of nongovernmental actors within the human rights movement in interesting and productive ways. This is the future. And we, lawyers trained in the Global North, have unique opportunities to be part of it by applying new theories, new tools, and new collaborations. Thus, I have re-examined my own work to ask: How can I contribute, through Berkeley Law, to this moment? II. The Case for Leveraging Technology for Rights Advocacy In thinking about this question, I’ve come to realize that, to meet the moment, human rights advocacy must take into account the pervasiveness of technology and harness it to advance justice. To do so, I am starting a new clinic at the law school called the Global Rights Innovation Lab Clinic, or GRIL. In building this new clinic, I am guided by the questions Professor Carolyn Patty Blum and I asked over twenty-five years ago when we started the International Human Rights Law Clinic: How can international law and we as international lawyers help address urgent human rights problems? Today, one powerful but underutilized tool at our disposal is the ability to leverage data and digital technologies. When we think about technology and law, most of us think about how law can regulate technologies to prevent abuses of individual and collective rights. Over the past decade, questions of global governance of technology have taken more and more of my attention. These questions grew more pressing not because I sought them out, but because I could no longer ignore the weaponization of technology. Perpetrators increasingly use digital tools to target human rights activists, and I worked with clients to craft legal strategies and fight back. Whether it was working to free imprisoned activists in countries throughout the Arab Gulf region or fighting against cybersecurity laws that criminalized human rights groups around the globe, I helped to document violations, write policy briefs, and file petitions by relying on client testimony and other conventional forms of proof gathered through traditional lawyering methods. But technology can also be used to advance the protection of rights. This is what some call public interest technology , [9] or data for good. [10] Human rights advocates are just beginning to harness the full potential of what this area has to offer. It is here, at the intersection of technology and global rights, that I see great opportunity for a new clinic to fill a service gap, leverage new technology tools, and train students for legal advocacy in the digital age. III. Global Rights Innovation Lab Clinic To do so I’m working with Valentina Rozo Angel , a human rights data scientist, to create GRIL with a mission to harness digital tech to advance global rights advocacy. And harness we must if we are going to keep up with global challenges. We need to bring new tools to address the large-scale violations of armed conflict, the climate emergency, surveillance capitalism, and other transnational threats to societies. We see an opportunity to help advocates access and analyze a sea of relevant data to identify the prevalence of violations, patterns of harm, and paths of responsibility to build cases for justice. We hear from groups that they need help expanding digital storytelling and data visualization to engage and enlarge public support for human rights cases and values. Equipped with new methods of data analysis, we plan to work with advocates to expose hidden patterns in open-source information or public databases. We are eager to explore generating new kinds of evidence with digital 3D modeling of crime scenes or using satellite images to produce damage calculations in support of human rights litigation. These techniques elevate human rights lawyering tools to align with the digital age. In GRIL, law students will work alongside technologists and data scientists. They will acquire tech literacy in an advocacy context. They will enter the profession with a first-hand understanding of how machine learning, data modeling techniques, generative AI, and other methods can support legal practice. We must be strategic about how and where we intervene. We need to invest in spaces where facts and truth still matter. Remember, human rights cases win on the facts. This means we will identify opportunities before independent courts at the national, regional, and international levels. It also means equipping international bodies with accurate facts because there are contexts, like in judgments from the International Court of Justice, where independent fact-finding will be amplified. When international institutions are effective, they can still impact State behavior and persuade a broader audience in the court of public opinion. GRIL is eager to support communities closest to the ground to tell their stories, consolidate support, and reach new audiences. This may push human rights advocates outside of our comfort zones and into spaces of cultural production and public education, whether that is through collaborations on museum exhibitions, interactive online curricula, or even video games.   GRIL may not necessarily work in all these areas. We are guided by the needs of directly impacted communities and the opportunities available to us through the university’s resources. We are cognizant of the embarrassment of riches in the technology and human rights spaces in which we sit.   We aim to complement the work of Berkeley Law’s Human Rights Center. Its Digital Investigations Lab led by Alexa Koenig has pioneered techniques [11] to collect and analyze publicly available digital information in support of accountability for atrocity crimes. GRIL aims to apply additional data analysis tools to open-source evidence to help build cases for clients seeking accountability for violations of human rights and international criminal law. The law school’s Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic has long been a leader in clinical teaching on tech governance. I look forward to a productive working relationship with the clinic. Applying technology in a rights-compliant manner must be at the center of GRIL. Ethical human rights lawyering means that we “do no harm,” and I am delighted to have such expert and generous colleagues to advise and help guide this work. Conclusion I want to end with some important acknowledgments The Riesenfeld Award recognizes my contribution to the field of international law and human rights. A contribution that in turn is the product of a web of collaborations and support that spans years and decades. The International Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRLC) was my professional home for more than twenty-five years, where I worked alongside and learned immensely from Professor Roxanna Altholz . The Clinic sits within Berkeley Law’s larger clinical program, where I have been graced with wonderful clinical colleagues whose support and advice have made me a better teacher. I want to thank my current and former students, the heartbeat of clinical education, who inspire me every semester. My colleagues here at Berkeley and beyond are a constant source of support and intellectual renewal when I need it most. It is through your engagement that I can see more clearly the flaws in my work and get ideas for how to improve it. I want to recognize Professors Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein . When they invited me to participate in the early work of the Human Rights Center , they set the trajectory of my career and I am forever grateful. I owe a bottomless debt of gratitude to my family for their support of my work over the years, despite its tax on our household. Our daughter asked me when she was young why I choose my work over my family, traveling so frequently. I told her that I was trying to make the world a better place. She paused and said: “It’s not working.” What she couldn’t understand then is that fighting for human rights is its own reward and change may visible only over a long period. Whether I was sitting with former Guantanamo detainees who were trying to make new lives after their release; male survivors of sexual violence in Uganda fighting for reparations; or advocates of illegally imprisoned human rights activists , I have always felt that it is an honor to serve clients, community partners, and frontline advocates advance human rights. They have trusted me and the institutions I represent to strengthen their struggle for justice and I have tried to be worthy of that trust. As international lawyers, we are equipped with a special set of tools. We cannot use them like a magic wand, but we can be strategic legal counselors to victims and communities. We can work in solidarity to support their rights struggles, identify opportunities to advance justice and serve them as they travel that journey. That is the lesson that Stephan Riesenfeld taught me. I met Steve just after I graduated law school, and I sought his advice on how to use international law to prosecute war crimes in the Balkans. At the time, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had no accused in custody, and its prospects for gaining jurisdiction over any were dim. Human rights advocates were in despair; we saw the tribunal as our only hope for justice. Steve waived off these concerns. He told me that States could prosecute accused war criminals in their territory under the theory of universal jurisdiction. “But what about all the domestic legal challenges,” I asked. “No, no, no!” he shouted at me. “The law is there. You’ve just got to make it work!” So, my last thank you is to Steve for his admonition. I’ve been trying to follow your advice ever since. Thank you again for this recognition. [1] David Grewal, From American Empire to Nuclear Westphalia , Compact (Mar. 03, 2025) https://www.compactmag.com/email/5962afe7-6d44-497e-b5a3-2597d179b467/?ref=compact-newsletter . [2] Brian Stelter,  Kellyanne Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on Crowd Size , CNN (Jan. 22, 2017, 3:44 PM),  https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html . [3] Gabriela Pomeroy & George Wright,  Trump Calls Zelensky a ‘Dictator’ as Rift Between Two Leaders Deepens , BBC News (Feb. 19, 2025),  https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjev2j70v19o . [4] Aryeh Neier, The International Human Rights Movement: A History 184 (Course book ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2020). [5] Press Release, Security Council, Sec'y-Gen. Hails Int'l Crim. Ct. as Centrepiece of ‘New Age of Accountability,’ Urges Enhanced Coop. with Sec. Council, U.N. Press Release SC/ 10793 (Oct. 17, 2012). [6] See generally César Rodríguez-Garavito, Litigating the Climate Emergency How Human Rights, Courts, and Legal Mobilization Can Bolster Climate Action(Cambridge Univ. Press 2022). [7] See generally The Pluriverse of Human Rights: The Diversity of Struggles for Dignity (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Bruno Sena Martins eds., 2021) [8] Join Our New Cohort: ESCR-Net Launches Feminist Participatory Action Research Initiative , ESCR-Net (Mar. 3, 2025), https://www.escr-net.org/news/2025/escr-net-launches-feminist-participatory-action-research-initiative-join-our-new-cohort/ . [9] The Public Interest Technology University Network , PIT-UN (last visited Mar 25, 2025), https://pit-un.org/about-us/ . [10] Datasets for Good , PIT-UN (last visited Mar 25, 2025), https://pit-un.org/datasets-for-good/ . [11] Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations: A Practical Guide on the Effective Use of Digital Open Source Information in Investigating Violations of International Criminal, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law , U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/20/2.

About the Author: Stefanie Uhl studied librarianship at Stuttgart Media University, Germany. She also holds a Master’s degree in Educational Management. She works as the head of a public library in the Stuttgart region of Germany. In 2024/2025, she is also giving lectures in information pedagogy at Stuttgart Media University. Since 2021, she has been a PhD candidate at the University of Lucerne, Switzerland, at the Lucerne Graduate School in Ethics of the Institute of Social Ethics where she is working on her PhD thesis with the working title “Libraries as a Place for Human Rights Education.” Stefanie Uhl. Image provided by Stefanie Uhl. Education about Human Rights is a Human Right and Public libraries should be mandated to fulfill the public task of Human Rights Education Introduction Libraries as they currently operate help fulfill the Human Right to Education and have the potential to be transformed to ensure the provision of Human Rights Education (" HRE "). Libraries around the world operate under different legal ordinances. Public libraries find their regulations in national law, often differing between   countries and States. The International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA)  and UNESCO published the IFLA/ UNESCO Manifesto 2022  aiming to highlight the mission of public libraries towards the right to education. Public libraries contribute to this right by providing access to information and knowledge and by taking action towards a literate society. Even though libraries contribute to the realization of economic, cultural, and social rights, they are affected by financial cuts . Investments in libraries are investments in a free, democratic, and prospering society, guaranteeing Human Rights (" HR "). In compliance with the requirements of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training ,   states shall take all available means for the implementation of HR to HRE. Libraries and their extensive global network  must be  regarded as these means. Existing library laws should incorporate this requirement, and newly created legal standards should take this up too. Library law  can guarantee the operation of libraries in the   best possible way and guarantee a high standard of   library work by securing funding and making the operation of libraries an obligatory task for cities and communities. With secure   conditions, the worldwide network of libraries can continue to contribute to   HR . The Right to Education The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)  declares education in Article 26 as a   HR. Education, in fundamental and elementary stages, shall be free. Higher education shall be accessible and professional, and technical education shall be available. Human personality and its full development shall be a goal of education, along with promoting HR. The UDHR is not a legally binding document but finds its implementation in international law through binding UN treaties . To obtain legal effect, HR must be implemented in state law. States have reaffirmed the HR in nine UN treaty bodies.  Still, there are violations of   the HR to education all around the globe, as, for example,  refugee children who have no access to schooling in the EU , girls in Afghanistan who are not allowed to attend schools ,  or trans rights in the US . The right to education is also taking part, amongst others, in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) , the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) ,  and in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) . Human Rights Education To protect and promote HR, everyone   must have knowledge about these rights to claim them for themselves and for others. Within the right to education comes the right to human rights education . HRE, as the instrument to strengthen HR, is more than knowledge; it is education for, through, and about HR, as held in the General Assembly resolution 66/137 . “About” HR means providing knowledge about HR and the understanding of its   principles and norms. Also, the protection mechanisms are part of the learning content. Education “through” HR means respecting   the HR of learners and educators in the teaching process. “For” HR is understood as empowering HR by claiming it   for oneself and others. This definition supports the holistic approach  of human rights education . States hold the primary responsibility   for the implementation of HRE : as  recorded in Article 7   of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training , States are primarily   responsible for ensuring HRE. Creating a safe environment for engagement in HRE and full protection of those   engaged in the process is   part of a State's   duty. Taking different requirements and appropriate means into account, States should strive for the implementation of HRE with all available resources. HRE should be part of the training of State officials, military personnel, judges , and   law enforcement officials. Such training should include   teachers and other educators, like   library workers. Understanding of Education The term “education” differs in its meaning. While the UDHR and the Child Rights Convention (CRC) focus on   formal school settings, UNESCO documents broaden the concept of education. The Incheon Declaration (2015)  adds “quality,” as listed in the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, as a criterion for education, meaning that education should   aim to transform the lives of individuals   and societies. The definition of education out of the declaration makes clear that education is limited only to learning. The outcomes are not just in   formal school settings, but also in being able to think critically and creatively. Education thus becomes an instrument for shaping one's own    mindsets. Rethinking Education (2015)  notes the importance of organized learning in all forms of education (formal, informal, non-formal) and sets this as criterion   of education. With also having the SDGs as the main goal, the document adds safe places for learners as a prerequisite for education. And by focusing on formal and non-formal education, it also positions the latter as an important education setting. In translations, education may vary in its understanding in different languages. This also should be considered when the term “education” is used. Libraries as a Place for Human Rights Education As they already contribute to the SDGs, libraries are a place for HRE, even if only implicit. The IFLA Library Map of the World shows libraries'   activities towards the SDGs, in Goal 4 Quality Education and beyond. Explicit HRE is necessary to fulfill the demand for   a   holistic approach towards HRE. As everyone has the right to HRE, marginalized groups are moving into the spotlight, as they were previously excluded. As a place where no prerequisites are needed for usage, libraries might be the only place where rights holders can assert their rights. Library staff need   HRE to act on behalf of and to demand their rights towards library users, as the holistic approach requires. Libraries support formal school settings and work in non-formal and informal settings. By having locations in many cities, communities, or suburbs, libraries are widespread and easy to reach in many countries. The library system offers fixtures, fittings, and professional personnel, and investigations can extend the possibilities in library work, thus helping people stay connected through   technological   progress. Conclusion Libraries are unique public spaces that offer a wide range of media and access to digital services, even in rural areas . Having a wide range of resources and unrestrained access, and being a part of the public sector, libraries can also serve as places for the implementation of HRE. In addition to being a hub for education, libraries have also always taken on social tasks  and serve as  places for social interaction, which is urgently needed in times of increasing tensions around the world . They reach out to people of all ages, particularly children and young adults, giving them literacy skills and a place to spend their time, but are also committed to diversity , resisting  book bans ,  and are sites for political protest . By bringing together different educational settings and respecting users’ human dignity and HR, libraries are pivotal towards the broader implementation of the HR to HRE globally.

About the Authors: Param Kailash is a fourth-year student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune, with a strong interest in Private and Public International Law, International Relations, and Finance. An avid writer, he contributes insightful articles to various blogs and journals, analyzing contemporary legal developments across Corporate Law and related fields. He can be reached at parambkailash@outlook.com . Sudiksha Moorthi is also a fourth-year student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune, with a focus on International Criminal Law, White-Collar Crimes, and Financial Regulation. Passionate about legal writing, she explores key developments in both Indian and global legal landscapes through her contributions to various publications. She can be reached at sudikshamoorthi@outlook.com . First Resumption of the Seventh Session of the Assembly of States Parties at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Available here . Introduction The International Criminal Court (" ICC ") and other International Criminal Law (" ICL ") tribunals have been continually praised for their commitment to prosecuting perpetrators of  the most severe crimes . However, the ICL and human rights communities have sometimes displayed undue optimism towards the ICC, and have perhaps grown complacent with its failures. The application for arrest warrants  by Karim A.A. Khan KC before Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC-1) against Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant, and Hamas leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes on May 20, 2024, has recently brought the ICC into the limelight. Scrutiny towards the role of the ICC was also furthered through the most recent arrest warrant issued against Iyad Ad Ghaly  for crimes against humanity and war crimes on June 21, 2024. These arrest warrants, aiming to symbolize a beacon of hope, fall drastically short when judged against the metrics of successful implementation. The ICC’s dependence on participation and cooperation by state parties to transfer wanted suspects into custody and follow Court proceedings warrants rightful doubt and fosters disbelief in the system. We argue that the ICC’s reliance on state parties and subsequent failures in executing arrest warrants, especially considering recent events in Palestine, expose the limitations of the Court’s functionality in modern global affairs. This reality risks leading to a post-mortem of the Court. Functional Implications – Modern-day Examples Despite measures to curb non-compliance, 30 individuals  against whom the ICC has issued arrest warrants remain at large  to date . Collectively, these perpetrators are sought for over 200 counts of crimes , including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and offenses against the administration of justice. Moreover, the Court issued seven of these arrest warrants over a decade ago . This persistent failure to execute warrants represents a notable oversight, undermining the ICC’s ability to prosecute individuals who pose a significant threat to the international community.   It is imperative to recognize that the crimes prosecuted by the Court do not occur in isolation; these crimes occur in broader contexts of systemic and extreme criminality intended to serve larger goals. For instance, the situation in Darfur has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilian lives and the displacement of 7.1 million people  in pursuance of ethnic cleansing against non-Arabs.  The failure to enforce arrest warrants undermines judicial authority, endangers witnesses and victims, compromises evidence, and fails to establish a deterrence mechanism. This inability to execute arrest warrants, even in cases considered ‘ dire by any metric ’ by the Office of the Prosecutor (“ OTP ”), involving crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, calls into question the ICC’s relevance and authority.  There are numerous instances where suspects have visited states party to the Statute, only for the relevant authorities of such states to refuse to arrest them. For example,  Al-Bashir ,  the first sitting head of state ever indicted by the ICC, visited Djibouti, Nigeria, Chad, and South Africa - all parties to the Statute - without being transferred to the ICC. These visits occurred despite warrants for five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and three counts of genocide.  The fundamental need for states to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with neighboring countries and trade blocs tends to override their obligations under international treaties. This dynamic has been demonstrated in cases such as Al Bashir’s and Abdel Raheem Muhammad’s, where the African Union’s decision  urged member states not to comply with ICC warrants. In both instances, Chad received Bashir and Abdel Raheem and attributed the non-compliance to failures in communication between its justice and foreign affairs ministers. However, ICC judges deemed this reasoning invalid and the ICC judges construed the avoidance as intentional . During this time, Sudan and Chad developed strong diplomatic ties and deployed a Border Control Force  along their common borders, which likely contributed to the non-execution of arrest warrants. Despite Chad’s non-compliance, the UNSC chose to take no action  against Chad, neither imposing consequences nor deterring other states  from engaging in similar behavior.    In addition to the non-compliance by state parties, the United Nations (" UN ") has also defied the ICC arrest warrants. For example, Ahmad Muhammad Harun was appointed to oversee the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)  despite an outstanding arrest warrant and facing 20 counts of crimes against humanity and 22 counts of war crimes  for his actions in Darfur, Sudan. Furthermore, in 2011, the UN facilitated his travel  within Darfur, completely disregarding the warrant.  The Rome Statute provides that non-compliance can be referred to the ASP or the UN Security Council. However, in all the communications made to the ASP and UNSC, no plausible enforcing mechanism  has been developed, and the Statute lacks clear guidelines or provisions to direct further action by the ASP and UNSC. As a result, suspects remain at large for decades, with no consequences for states that refuse to comply. This lack of enforcement and the ICC’s reliance on voluntary cooperation are weaknesses that have been criticized even by ICC judges themselves . Politics in the ICC One of the primary reasons for state party non-compliance is the political dynamics that influence the Court’s operations. The politicization of the Court was established with the introduction of the UNSC into the functioning of the ICC . The veto power of the United States in the UNSC raises doubts about the council’s reliability in contributing to the ICC, particularly given the tensions between the US and the Court that existed even before the Statute entered into force. The Rome Statute was adopted with the US voting against it , and the US has continuously resisted the Court through measures such as the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,  which prohibits any US financial support to the ICC, and the US’s abstention  from the vote to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. These dynamics render the execution of politically sensitive arrest warrants, such as the one against Netanyahu, nearly impossible. Historical precedents suggest that without significant structural changes to the ICC’s operations, instances of non-compliance will persist, undermining the Court’s credibility and effectiveness.  Recently, the U.S. has demonstrated its resistance to the ICC by threatening potential sanctions in response to the OTP’s application for arrest warrants against Netanyahu. Given the current geopolitical climate and the U.S.'s global influence, persistent non-compliance with the ICC could become the norm. This reluctance raises critical concerns, as the extensive powers of the Assembly of State Parties allow for the Court to be swayed by powerful or bloc-aligned states. Unless fundamental change is brought about to the operations of the ICC, these instances of non-compliance will repeat persistently. In a situation where Netanyahu’s arrest warrant is issued by PTC-1, especially considering the US’s unwavering support to Israel, previous records suggest execution of such a warrant is nearly impossible.  The Way Forward We suggest a two-fold mechanism to enhance the ICC’s judicial process: firstly, in absentia or remote proceedings ought to be established by the Court, similar to those adopted by the ICTY under Rule 61  of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the ICTR under Rule 82  of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These rules allow for in absentia proceedings, which permit the confirmation of charges and the trial and presentation of evidence in open Court without the accused being present. Although these provisions go beyond the current scope of the Rome Statute, we recommend implementing a similar procedure, at least to confirm charges at the pre-trial stage in exceptional circumstances such as the Bashir case.  Secondly, the ICC must effectively utilize its principle of complementarity by establishing a prosecutorial mechanism in collaboration with domestic judicial institutions. This system would enable the ICC to support local investigations and indictments, enhancing its capacity to address international crimes within domestic contexts. While these recommendations may strengthen the Court’s operational framework, challenges for enforcement, geopolitical biases, and international political dynamics suggest that international law will continue to struggle to overcome the inherent structural limitations and deliver consistent and impactful justice.  Conclusion International law and treaty obligations have become largely symbolic rather than practical due to a lack of political inclination to enforce them. The ICC’s reliance on state parties to execute arrest warrants has exposed significant flaws within its operational framework. Notwithstanding the Court’s noble intentions and the robust legal framework created by the Rome Statute, political and administrative challenges continue to obstruct the effective execution of the Court's judicial process. Persistent non-compliance and politicization of the Court have left over 200 counts of some of the most serious crimes unresolved, emphasizing the critical need to implement institutional reform. Without decisive action, the ICC risks fading into irrelevance in the realm of international justice rather than standing as its champion.